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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the simplest neoclassical economy in which agents have finite 
lives and there is sustained per capita growth. The growth rate of the world economy 
depends upon countries' savings propensities and common technology. Trade can 
reverse an economy's autarkic growth trajectory, and a country with a high savings 
rate runs a current account surplus. If a surplus country expands aggregate demand 
while a deficit country contracts analogously, world growth increases. An appro-
priate international policy can change the path of the world economy from stagnation 
to growth. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between economic 
growth, trade flows, and policies affecting aggregate demand in open 
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economies. Any investigation of these phenomena must contain three 
elements. First, the economy under analysis must actually grow. Second, 
there must be some heterogeneity in the model in order to generate trade 
flows. And third, there must be a role for macroeconomic policy in the 
development process. This paper shows that international policies promote 
growth when they transfer wealth from countries with low savings rates to 
those with high rates. In essence, transferring resources from spendthrift to 
thrifty members of today’s generation improves the welfare of all future 
generations. 
The first piece of the puzzle involves growth. The economy described 
below exhibits per capita consumption growth if the world savings rate is 
sufficiently high. This economy has two sectors, the first producing a 
consumption good and the second producing an investment good. The 
growth rate is an increasing function of the savings rate and the marginal 
efficiency of investment. Since there are constant returns to scale in each 
sector,. growth occurs only if the relative price of the investment good 
becomes arbitrarily small.’ Rebel0 (1991) described this economy for the 
case of an infinitely lived agent. 
The second piece involves heterogeneity. A country is a sequence of 
agents having similar preferences, and countries differ in three ways. They 
have different savings propensities, different absolute sizes, and different 
initial endowments of capital. In equilibrium, thrifty countries run current 
account surpluses and accumulate net foreign assets. Also, a capital-rich 
country may have an initial deficit on the capital account, owing to an 
outflow of investment that equalizes factor prices across countries. 
The third piece of the puzzle involves economic policy and its affect on 
aggregate demand. This paper assumes that countries impose lump-sum 
taxes or transfers denominated in their own national fiat assets. In equilib- 
rium, paper assets bear the same rate of return as claims against capital.* If 
agents in each generation have different savings rates, there is a class of 
transfers that can actually turn a shrinking world economy into a growing 
one. A country with a current account surplus expands domestic aggregate 
demand, while the deficit country contracts analogously. A coordinated 
policy keeps paper assets from crowding out real economic investment in 
either country, thus promoting world growth. 
There has been relatively little work in this area, although Jones and 
Manuelli (1990) studied trade and growth in a model with infinitely lived 
agents. In a classic paper, Gale (1971) first explored trade imbalances in a 
’ De Long and Summers (1991) showed that a low relative prices of investment goods is 
positively correlated with growth rates between 1960 and 1985 for a wide sample of countries. 
* The model below is close in spirit to the classic one of Diamond (1965), although I allow 
intra-generational heterogeneity and examine equilibria that do not converge to a steady state. 
simple dynamic economy. Jones and Manuelli (1992) examined tax policies 
in a growing economy with finitely lived agents, but they focused on 
redistributions between agents of different generations, not different coun-
tries. In an elegant paper, Baxter (1992) examined the dynamic properties 
of the two-sector model, but she analyzed steady states in a model where 
countries are infinitely-lived agents. The literature on endogenous growth 
and international trade is growing rapidly (see Grossman and Helpman, 
1989; Young, 1991; and Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, for examples), but 
these authors study economies with increasing returns to scale. 
2. Summary of the results 
Although the model outlined in Section 3 seems special, it captures the 
asymptotic behavior of any growing convex economy with finitely lived 
agents, a point I emphasize in earlier work (Fisher, 1992). Such an 
economy’s growth rate depends on only three crucial elements: labor’s share 
in the economy, the marginal efficiency of investment, and the marginal 
propensity to save. The economy described below exhibits balanced growth, 
and the equilibrium allocations are efficient. 
Section 4 examines the model for two open economies. It shows that 
factor-price equalization occurs in finite time. World economic growth 
depends upon the savings propensities in both countries, and the thrifty 
country acquires net foreign assets in each period. Hence surplus countries 
are precisely those with a higher than average asymptotic marginal propen- 
sity to save. Although I describe savings rates by specifying the agents’ 
preferences, one can think of these parameters more generally. In par-
ticular, any long-run policy that discourages consumption and encourages 
savings will increase the growth rate of a closed economy. Under this more 
general interpretation, a surplus country is one whose policies encourage 
savings more than the world average. 
Section 5 describes policies that increase world economic growth. These 
policies are lump-sum transfers between members of the same generation, 
and they do not crowd out real economic investment. I am tempted to call 
these tax-transfers monetary policy, but there is no simple dichotomy in 
models of overlapping generations between monetary and fiscal policy. One 
can think of these policies instead as profiles of national generational debt. 
A country runs an expansionary policy if it increases debt and suffers a 
concomitant worsening of external balances. My main result is that any 
institution inducing surplus countries to expand and deficit countries to 
contract enhances world growth. A system of fixed exchange rates works 
exactly in this way if foreign exchange flows are not sterilized. The current 
practice of occasional economic summits among the major industrial (G-7) 
countries serves to coordinate fiscal policies analogously. Section 6 presents 
brief conclusions. 
3. The model in a closed economy 
The demographic structure of the economy is that of the model of 
overlapping generations, with L agents per generation. The ‘old’ agents 
alive at the beginning of the economy live for only one period, and each is 
endowed with K, lL > 0 units of capital and nothing else. Each agent in 
generation t 3 1 is endowed with one unit of labor in her youth and nothing 
else. Each of these agents lives for two periods and saves some of her wage 
in order to finance consumption in old age. Since the population is constant, 
the development process entails per capita growth. 
There are two sectors in the economy, and each is characterized by a 
linearly homogeneous production function. The first sector produces a 
perishable consumption good, and the second produces an investment good. 
The production function for the consumption good is 
where C, is the output of the consumption good, K,,, is the input of capital 
into that sector, and L, i is the input of labor into that sector, all measured 
at time t. The investment good is produced according to 
4 = P&,2 9 (2) 
where Z, is the output of the investment good and ZQ is the input of capital 
into that sector, both at time t. 
Since increments to an economy’s capital stock occur through investment, 
the law of motion for the stock of capital is 
Kt+1= (1 - SK + 4 7 (3) 
where K, is the capital stock at time t, and S E (0, l] is the depreciation rate. 
Investment is irreversible; hence, K,,, 5 (1 - S)K,. 
The economy’s resource .constraints are 
K,,, + Kr,2 G K, and L,,, s L , (4) 
which states that the supply of labor is constant. 
Let h EZZ,, the index set of agents born at time t. Preferences are 
summarized by the utility functions 
u”(c:) = log c: , if h E H,, , (5) 
and 
where cp is agent h’s consumption at time t. The preferences in (5) entail a 
savings rate that is independent of the interest rate. 
Let P,,i be the price of good i, IV, be the wage rate, and R, be the rentals 
rate, all at time t. We shall use the convention P,,, = 1;3 hence, all prices are 
in terms of the consumption good at time 1. The present value of the income 







if hEH,, with tal, 
since each member of the initial generation is endowed with K,IL units of 
capital and every other agent is endowed with one unit of labor. 
Agent h maximizes 
u”(4) 
s.t. P, Ic; + P,>,k; s Yh , (6) 
c:>O, and (l-S)K,lL+k:sO, if hEHo, 
and 
s-t. P,,,c: + Pt+1,d+I + (Pt,z - R,+,)k: + P,+,,&+l G Yh 7 
(c:, c:+,> 3 (O,O), and (l-S)kF+kF+,20, if hEH,, tal, 
where k: is h’s demand for capital at time t and the inequalities represent a 
present-value budget constraint. The term (Pt,2 - R,,,) reflects the fact that 
a ent h E H, rents out his capital before it depreciates in period t + 1. If 
8k,, r < 0, then agent h E H, sells capital in the second period of her life, the 
situation one might expect when claims on capital serve as stores of value. 
Firm i E {1,2} chooses K,,i. > 0 and L --1,1> d to maximize 
Pt,iQt,i- Wt., - RtKt.i . (7) 
Since production functions (1) and (2) are linearly homogeneous, firm i’s 
profits at time t are zero. Hence the solution to (7) maximizes the present 
value of a firm’s equity. Since labor is not an input in (2), L,,, = 0. 
3 Since there are two goods in this economy, there is no simple definition of the real interest 
rate. The ratio P,,ilP,+I i is commodity i’s gross own rate of return, and a commodity has a 
positive rate of return if its present price is shrinking. The law of motion for capital implies that 
its gross own rate of return is 1+ p - 6, which is greater than unity if the marginal efficiency of 
investment is sufficiently high. 
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices and aggregate quantities 
(i) consumer h E H,-, U ri, solves (6); 
(ii) firm i E {1,2} solves (7); 

(iii> G,,I-1 c: + ChEH, c: s C, ; 

(iv) 	resource constraints (4) are satisfied; 

69 K+1 evolves according to (3); and 

(vi) I(, > 0 is given. 
Condition (i) expresses utility maximization, (ii) profit maximization, (iii) 
the materials balances condition, (iv) the full employment constraints, (v) 
the trajectory of the capital stockP and (vi) the initial condition. 
If Q,,, > 0, profit maximization implies that 
where k, 1 = K,,, lL is the capital-labor ratio in the first sector in period t. 
Also, if & > 0, the wage rate in period t is 
Since there are L workers, the economy’s wage bill is W,L. 
Because of the special form of the utility function, the savings of an agent 
born in period t 3 1 is uW,. As long as Pt,2 > 0, the equilibrium condition in 
the investment goods market implies 
where k,,, = K,,,IL is the economy’s capital-labor ratio at time t + 1. 
We are now in a position to describe the trajectory of the economy. 
Define the gross marginal efficiency of investment r = 1 - 6 + p, and let 
G = k,, rIk, be the gross rate of growth of the capital stock along a balanced 
growth path. Then simple algebra as in Rebel0 (1991) shows that 
G = max{J’cr[l - 6][~(1- 0) -t f3]-‘, 1 -S} . 	 (9) 
Growth occurs only if both the marginal efficiency of investment and the 
marginal propensity to save are sufficiently high. Furthermore, the growth 
rate is independent of the initial capital stock. A large value of &IL is a 
‘level’ effect; ‘growth’ effects depend upon the savings rate, labor’s share in 
the first sector, and the marginal efficiency of investment. 
4 Another way of expressing (v) is to state that EheCH,-,un,j k: G I,. Since ChEn,_, k: = 
-(l - &)K, and Chexz k: = K,,,, this expression is equivalent to the more familiar K,,, s (l- 
6)Kz + I,. 
A convenient measure of the interest rate from period t to t + 1 is 
1 + it+1 = c,l~pt+‘,‘~ the relative price of consumption between those 
periods.5 Along a balanced growth path with positive investment, this rate is 
1 + it+, = Z-/G’-” , (10) 
for all t + 1. Eq. (1) implies that consumption grows at the rate G”. Since 
G < r, 1 + i,,, > G’ ; hence, a balanced growth path is efficient. 
In equilibrium, the consumption profile of agent h born at t 3 1 is 
(11) 
This completes the description of the model in a closed economy. 
4. The model with two open economies 
In keeping with the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm, I consider a 
foreign economy with an identical technology but allow the marginal 
propensities to save to differ between economies. I shall use the convention 
that an asterisk represents a variable in the foreign country; for example, 
1 - (+* is the foreign marginal propensity to consume and KT is the initial 
stock of capital in the foreign country. 
There are L domestic and L* foreign workers; let p = L/(L + L *) and 
CL*= L* l(L + L*) be the relative sizes of the home and foreign economies, 
respectively. Since the populations of both economies are constant, the 
model captures only the effects of relative sizes of countries, not differences 
in their rates of demographic growth. This is not a serious limitation because 
the world economy will converge to that of the closed economy with the 
fastest rate of population growth. Then an appropriate re-definition of the 
rate of depreciation of capital could be used to describe per capita growth in 
the world economy. 
Foreign firms still have production function (1) or (2), but now the law of 
motion for foreign economy’s capital stock is 
K,*,,=(l-S)K;+Z:+Z,, (3*) 
where Zf is foreign production of the investment good and Z, is imports of 
’ It is worth emphasizing again that this relative price is not the real interest rate in this 
economy. It is the gross own rate of return on consumption foregone, and I use it in the 
arguments below to state that the equilibrium allocations are dynamically efficient. A rigorous 
demonstration of the dynamic efficiency of the equilibrium allocations uses two facts. First, 
along a balanced growth path the limiting present value of the capital stock is zero. Second the 
Gaussian curvature of each consumer’s indifference surface evaluated at the equilibrium 
allocations is bounded. 
the investment good into the foreign economy, both at time t. Two 
comments are in order. First, the two countries face the same rates of 
depreciation. Second, since the investment good is traded, the rentals rate 
will be equalized if there is positive investment in both countries. 
The law of motion for the domestic economy’s capital stock is now 
K t+l = Cl- 6)Kt + 1, - Z, , 
where Z, is production of the investment good by domestic firms and 2, 
denotes exports of that good from the domestic economy, both at time t. 
The foreign economy’s resource constraints are 
K:l + K,:* G K,* and LIT, G L* . 
Labor is not mobile between countries, and the present value of an agent’s 
wage may depend upon her location. 
An equilibrium with international trade is a sequence of prices and 
corresponding aggregate quantities 
such that for each t: 
(i) consumer h E H,- 1 U H, solves (6); 
(ii) firm i E {1,2} solves (7) given factor prices in its own country; 
(iii) ChEH,-, c: + ChEH, c: G C, + C:; 
(iv) resource constraints (4) and (4*) are satisfied; 
(v) K,,, follows (3’) and Kt*,, follows (3*);6 and 
(vi) K, > 0 and Kr > 0 are given. 
In such an equilibrium countries will typically trade the consumption good, 
the investment good, and claims on capital. 
The equilibrium for the international economy is that of the world 
economy considered as an integrated system if and only if both economies 
are incompletely specialized in the production of both goods or, equiva-
lently, if factor-price equalization occurs. We will now explore the conditions 
ensuring factor-price equalization. 
Let ot = W,/R, be the domestic wage-rentals ratio at time t. It follows 
from (1) that 
k,,, = 0(1- 8))‘w, , 
where k, 1 is again the domestic capital-labor ratio in the first sector. Of 
course, the investment good is infinitely capital-intensive for any wage- 
’ Now the equilibrium condition for the investment good can be written as ChE(H,UH,-,j kf S 
I, + Z: , which again reduces to (3’) and (3*), although it need not be the case that the domestic 
demand for capital is met by sales from domestic residents and production from domestic firms. 
rentals ratio since that sector uses no labor. Hence, the only non-trivial 
pattern of complete specialization that can occur has the capital-poor 
country specialized in the consumption good with the other country 
incompletely specialized in both goods.’ This situation will indeed occur at 
time t if the countries have sufficiently different ratios of installed capital per 
worker. 
Assume now that one of the countries is completely specialized. Then the 
country with the lower capital-labor ratio will have a higher rentals rate 
than its trading partner, and no investment will take place in the capital-rich 
country. Now consider the evolution of the world economy. If the world 
savings rate is sufficiently low, there will be no investment in either country, 
the world economy will shrink at the rate (1 - 6 ), and the equilibrium is the 
trivial one with both countries staying on their autarkic no-growth paths and 
no trade in the world economy. Otherwise, all investment in the world 
economy occurs in the capital-poor country, and that country’s installed 
capital stock per worker grows strictly more quickly than does that in its 
trading partner. Hence, in finite time the countries must have sufficiently 
similar installed capital stocks per worker so that factor-price equalization 
does occur. We have just demonstrated: 
Proposition 1. If there is any investment at all in the world economy, then 
factor-price equalization will occur in finitely many periods. 
Proposition 1 shows that the capital stocks per worker in each country 
constitute an initial condition characterizing the preliminary phase of the 
trajectory of the world economy. They do not affect the world economy’s 
long-run growth rate. 
Before stating the second proposition, I define two terms. First, k”, = 
pk, + p*kT is the average endowment of capital per worker in the world 
economy at time t. Second, C? = pa + p*g* is the average propensity to 
save in the world. I can now state: 
Proposition 2. Let factor prices be equalized in the first period. Then there is 
an equilibrium with balanced growth, and the rate of growth is 
(12) 
Proof (By induction on t). Factor prices are equalized in the first period 
only if W, lR, < 8 -‘( 1 - 0) min{k,, k:}. Since preferences are homothetic, 
material balances imply that &V, = P, ,*( pk, + p *kz), where IV, is the wage 
’ In other words, the diversification cone is the entire half-space of capital-labor ratios such 
that k, > O( 1 - fI)-‘w,. 
in both countries. Using (8), the fact that P,,, = R,I& and the expressions 
for the wage and rentals rates, one can derive 
6(1- 8)k,,, = (elp)iz ) 
where k, 1 is the capital-labor ratio in the first sector for both economies. 
Since k”,jk”, = 1 - 6 + p(1 -k, ilk”,), this expression implies a balanced 
growth path, with G = &2/k, given by (12). Allocate investment so that 
G = k,lk, = k*,lkT, and note that 
W,lR, = GW,IR, < GO-‘(l-19) min{k,, kT} 
= K’(1 - 0) min{Gk,, Gk:} . 
Hence, factor prices are equalized in period 2. 
Now assume that factor prices are equalized in period t. Then W,IR, < 
O-l(l- O)k, and it+i/it is given by (12). But then Wt+llR,+l = GW,IR,. 
Again, we can allocate investment so that k,,, = Gk, and k,*,, = Gk,* . 
Hence, W,,, I&+, < 8-‘(l- 0) min{k,+,, k,*,,}, which implies factor-price 
equalization in period c + 1. q 
Since the investment good is traded, the equilibrium with factor-price 
equalization has a degree of static indeterminacy. I used this indeterminacy 
in the proof of Proposition 2, and it affects the definition of net foreign 
assets and thus the current account. Although the distribution of wealth, 
prices, and aggregate quantities are all tied down in equilibrium, the 
location of the capital stock in each period is not. I could just as well have 
described a cyclical allocation of the capital stock between countries as long 
as I kept each economy’s installed capital-labor ratio in the diversification 
cones as the world economy grew. 
Although the location of the capital stock can display cycles, its ergodic 
geographic distribution is determined because no country’s installed capital 
stock can grow strictly more quickly than the world’s capital stock for 
arbitrarily many periods. If if did, one country would be completely 
specialized in finite time, as the arguments leading to Proposition 1 
established. But such a situation is inconsistent with a perfect foresight 
equilibrium since investment flows ensure that the returns on capital are 
equalized. Likewise, no country’s installed capital stock can grow strictly 
more slowly than the world’s capital stock for arbitrarily many periods. 
Hence, the current account is not determined from period to period, but its 
long-run average behavior is indeed well defined. 
Proposition 2 and the analysis below assume that the installed capital 
stock in each period is proportional to the amount of labor located in each 
country. Thus there is no difference between the short-run and long-run 
behavior of the current account in such an equilibrium. The indeterminacy 
described above does not occur in a one-sector model with capital mobility 
because labor is a fixed factor. Equality of rental rates between countries 
ensures that capital is located in proportion to the workforce in each 
country. Thus the equilibria we examine in this paper are the natural analog 
of those in the Solow model, even though the two-sector model allows the 
relative price of investment o decline as a part of the development process. 
Now consider the direction of trade in the integrated world equilibrium. 
Domestic exports per worker of the consumption good at time t k 2 are 
x,=kfl , - (1 - a)W,lP,,, - (~TIG1-e)W,_,IP ,-,,, , 
where I have used (10) and (11). Since W,IP,,, = (W,_,IP,_, l)GB, x, = 
8kf,,(l - (T/C?). Hence, the home country exports the consumption good if 
and only if CT < Cr. We have just established: 
Proposition 3. The country with the higher savings rate imports the consump- 
tion good in period t > 1. 
Since the growth rate is increasing in the marginal propensity to save, (9) 
and (10) imply that the country with a lower savings rate has a higher 
autarkic interest rate. When the countries open for trade, the country with a 
lower interest rate experiences ‘capital flight’, as its residents acquire foreign 
assets in order to increase the return on their savings. 
Gale (1974) describes a model in which the world economy converges to a 
steady state and shows two similar results: first, the rate of growth of the 
world economy reflects a weighted average of the savings propensities of the 
individual countries; and second, the country with a higher savings rate 
imports the consumption good in the long run. The intuition behind Gale’s 
result is that the thrifty country will own a disproportionate share of the 
world stock of wealth in the long run. Since the steady state exhibits no 
further accumulation of net foreign assets, the country with a higher savings 
rate runs a trade deficit and consumes the proceeds of its rental income. 
In a growing world economy, each country’s share of world wealth 
remains constant.* But, in each period, the country with a higher savings 
rate accumulates a disproportionate share of the change in the world capital 
stock per worker; hence, it runs a current account surplus. This implies that 
the thrifty country finances its imports of the consumption good in two ways: 
by exporting the investment good and by a surplus on interest income. In 
the language of balance-of-payments accounting, the country with the higher 
’ This fact contrasts sharply with capital accumulation in a model with infinitely lived agents 
such as those of Becker (1980) and Baxter (1992). 
savings rate may have a merchandise trade deficit, but this deficit is more 
than offset by the surplus on investment income from abroad. 
For completeness, I state 
Proposition 4. Assume that the two countries have identical preferences. 
Then the country with the higher capital-labor ratio exports the investment 
good in period t = 1, and there in no net trade in period t > 1. 
Proof. Since (T = 8, 6 = u; hence, x, = 0 for all t 5 2. Since the members 
of generation t = 1 have identical preferences and factor prices are equal- 
ized, per capita demand for the consumption good is identical for all h E H, . 
Hence, for t = 1, x, > 0 if and only if k, > k: , since agents h E H, demand 
only the consumption good. q 
The capital-rich country exports the capital-intensive good in the first 
period if preferences are identical. This is the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, 
and it shows that initial conditions for the world economy are actually ‘level’ 
effects, not growth effects.’ Proposition 4 suggests that one can think of 
exports of the investment good as analogous to the outflow of capital. 
Hence, the capital-rich country has a current account deficit and loss of net 
foreign assets, representing an adjustment of the stocks of capital and 
equalizing the rate of return on investment in the two countries. This occurs 
in the initial stage of the world economy. 
The most striking implication of these propositions is that trade can 
reverse an autarkic growth trajectory. This result follows immediately from 
the observation that u may be such that the domestic economy will grow, 
but G may be sufficiently small so that the world economy will not grow. In 
particular a small thrifty economy may well export the investment good to a 
large spendthrift partner, thus precluding the possibility of growth. 
Of course, the change in the growth rate resulting from opening an 
economy to trade influences both the wage rate and the interest rate. For 
agent in generation t 2 1, the preferences described by (5) entail the indirect 
utility function: 
V(l + ir+l, VPt,,)= m~pt,lw + ir+tr . 
Hence, an increase in the real wage or the interest rate raises the welfare of 
any such agent. Since the transition from autarky to free trade may harm a 
member of generation 0 in order to benefit members of later generations, 
9 Recall that I have assumed throughout the analysis that the installed capital stock in each 
period is proportional to the amount of labor in each country. Without this assumption the 
static indeterminacy discussed in the paragraph below Proposition 2 occurs here too. 
the autarkic path and that of free trade may not be Pareto ranked. 
However, since 1 + i,,, > 0 in any equilibrium, infinitely many agents will 
benefit from a transition to a higher growth rate, no matter what happens to 
the interest rate when an economy opens for trade. 
5. International economic policies and growth 
Assume now that each government can levy lump-sum taxes and transfers 
on the agents located in its economy. Let b: be such a transfer imposed by 
the domestic government at time t on domestic h E H,-, U H,. If b: < 0, 
then h is taxed by her government, and if b: > 0, then h receives a subsidy. 
The present value of the income of domestic h E H, is now 
yh = R,K,JL + f’,,,b: , ifhEH,, 
Wt+P,,bb:+P,+,,bb:+l, ifhEH,,witht>l, 
where Pl,b is the present price of the tax or subsidy imposed by the domestic 
government at time t. An analogous expression is true for foreign residents, 
with Prb. being the present price of taxes bz*h levied abroad. I am using the 
formalism that the present price of these transfers need be defined in order 
to interpret them as receipts or taxes denominated in two different fiat assets 
in the discussion below. 
I am now in a position to state an important result. 
Theorem. Assume that preferences and technologies are such that one 
country will grow in an autarkic equilibrium. Then there is an international 
economic policy such that the world economy will grow. 
Proof. If the world savings rate ~7 is such that G > 1, then the theorem is 
true using the policy b: = 0 for all domestic h E H,, and (b:, b:+,) = (0,O) 
for all domestic h E H, with t > 1, with the analogous trivial policy for 
foreign residents. 
Now assume that Cr is such that the growth rate given in (12) satisfies 
G < 1. Without loss of generality, assume that the home country has a 
sufficiently high savings propensity so that it grows at rate G > 1 in autarky. 
Pick GE (1, G), and let Pt,b = P,+l,b = Pb and Pt,b* = Pr+l,b* = Pb*, where 
Pb and Pb* are strictly positive constants. Since the growth rate given in (12) 
is a continuous and monotonic function of 6, there is an (Y E (0,l) such that 
a world economy consisting of proportions CY= LI(L + L*) of domestic 
agents and cz* = 1 - (Y of foreign agents would grow at rate G. 
Let D, be the set of domestic agents and F, be the set of foreign agents, 
both born at time t. Now consider an international economic policy such 
that b:=O for hED,, bFh=O for hEF,, and 
c P,(bF = - c P,*@Y > 0 +bF+,) + b,*,*)
hED, hEF, 
for all t 3 1. Since factor-price equalization occurs in the economy with no 
tax transfers and since this transfer lowers the initial wage-rentals ratio, 
factor prices will still be equalized. Thus for any W, = v, we may choose 
b: + e+1 so that the relative share of world income accruing to domestic 
residents in each period is (Y. 
In particular, let IV, be the initial wage in a non-monetary economy 
growing at rate G. Then the monetary policy b: = 0 for h E D,, bFh = 0 for 
h E F,, (b:, bF+,) = (0, (a - ~)(W1l@b)(Glr)‘-‘) for h ED, with t 3 1, and 
(bTh, b,*,h,) = (0, (a* - ~*)(W*ICL*P~*)(G/T)‘-‘) for h EF, with t2 1 will 
induce the necessary transfer. Moreover, the present value of each foreign 
agent’s income is strictly positive. Hence, this policy supports an equilibrium 
such that the world economy grows at rate G > 1. Cl 
The economic policy described in the theorem has at least two interpreta- 
tions. The one I favor is that the theorem describes the distribution of 
seigniorage in the creation profiles of national debt.” This interpretation 
implies that the two fiscal or monetary authorities cooperate. The surplus 
country expands aggregate demand, increases world growth, and lowers 
international interest rates. The deficit country absorbs the excess interna- 
tional reserves created by its trading partner in order to keep financial assets 
from ‘crowding out’ real international investment. Using the jargon of 
balance-of-payments accounting, we may say that the surplus country runs 
an expansionary policy, while its trading partner contracts and accumulates 
foreign exchange reserves. The theorem describes an economy where 
growth is accomplished by direct foreign investment, with the surplus 
country purchasing a share of the capital located abroad. 
One could also interpret the policy described in the theorem as foreign 
aid. Direct transfers from a spendthrift donor to a thrifty recipient increase 
growth in both countries. Even though the two countries’ marginal efficien- 
cies of investment are identical, the propensity to save may be higher in the 
recipient country. Several initial generations in the donor country may be 
lo The fact that the present prices of the two assets are arbitrary positive constants is Kareken 
and Wallace’s (1981) celebrated indeterminacy result. In the context of this paper, it shows that 
the rates of return (in terms of consumption foregone) of paper assets and of claims against 
capital are equalized. In earlier work (Fisher, 1990), I showed that these kinds of debt profiles 
can give rise to arbitrary transfers of resources between countries in exchange economies. 
have also demonstrated that a positive stock of world debt crowds out real economic investment 
and slows the economy’s underlying growth rate (Fisher, 1993). 
I 
 hurt by the tax, but the transfer will increase the real wage of infinitely many 
future generations in both countries. 
The different interpretations of the theorem show that it describes, in 
essence, the effects of national aggregate demand on the growth rate of the 
world economy. I have been careful to analyze policies that neither distort 
intertemporal prices nor explicitly redistribute income between generations 
by running global generational surpluses or deficits. We may conclude that 
policies increasing aggregate demand in surplus countries without crowding 
out real economic investment have a positive effect on the growth rate of 
the world economy. This conclusion is general because the functional forms 
used above capture the asymptotic properties of a wide class of economies. 
6. Conclusion 
I have examined a model in which the growth rate of the world economy 
is influenced by economic policy. Analyzing lump-sum tax transfers makes it 
easy to find closed-form solutions describing the growth path of the world 
economy. Moreover, the policy described in the theorem induces efficient 
equilibrium allocations. Coordinated international policies allow govern-
ments to choose Pareto-optimal sequences of equilibrium allocations, and 
the role for policy in this model is quite different from the usual analysis of 
capital income taxation, with all its distortions in growing economies. 
The reader might feel uncomfortable with my first interpretation of the 
policy in the theorem since it entails that some countries create a negative 
stock of national debt. It is more natural to think of a change in the status 
quo with positive stocks of debt in every country. Increasing the stock of any 
national debt slows down the rate of growth of the world economy and 
transfers resources from generations not yet born to those alive today. Such 
a policy may be Pareto-efficient, but giving resources to agents with low 
savings rates is a sure-fire way to slow world growth. 
An important implication of this paper is that policies promote growth to 
the extent that they create seigniorage in countries where savings is 
encouraged. The specie-flow mechanism enforces exactly this kind of 
adjustment in a system of fixed exchange rates. Moreover, if we think of the 
instruments described in Section 5 as monetary policies, they are the only 
ones that redistribute resources from one country to another without 
crowding out real economic investment. This paper, then, has shown that 
the distribution of seigniorage in any international monetary system will 
affect world growth. Perhaps this observation will spur further interest in 
models of growth in which monetary or fiscal policy plays an explicit 
role. 
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